We have been focusing on politics in this column with the objective to document the contemporary history of the Gambia and to help our readers appraise themselves with the happenings of the past. We are now covering issues that culminated during the coup period of 1994. This we hope will go a long way in helping us have a better understanding of the evolution of politics in the Gambia as well as help forge a future genuine democratic dispensation for our homeland.

As the members of the AFPRC expressed contradictory opinions on the merits of establishing a National Consultative Committee to determine the time table to return to Democratic Constitutional Rule, an intense debate unfolded. We have been capturing the opinions expressed by prominent members of society on the timetable after the July 22 coup d’etat. In our last presentation we began the publication of the content of a memorandum submitted to the NCC by Halifa Sallah. We published a part of the memorandum which sought to inspire the members of the National Consultative Committee to fulfill their mandate without fear or favour; affection or ill-will. Allow us to continue from where we stopped:
Suffice it to say the fourth, fifth and sixth aspects of the programme of action that is “restructuring of the security services” “reconfirmation of the regime of economic policies and programmes” and the “list of 22nd July priority projects” do not feature in the timetable. Hence they are not determinants of the length of stay of the AFPRC in office. In fact, because of the lack of study of the timetable many critics of the four year timetable often accuse the AFPRC of engineering many projects just to maintain itself in power. The fact of the matter, however is that nothing had been indicated in the timetable which asserts that such and such a project has to be completed by such and such a date and year before handing over to an elected government. Hence, people should revisit the programme to know its true content before putting forth their arguments. This is the moment to put in place a culture of objective criticism.
I hope I have given chapter and verse to what are absolutely necessary to address comprehensively”
The next important matter to address is an alternative transition framework
CONCEPTIONS ON ALTERNATIVE TRANSITIONAL FRAMEWORKS
Of course what has been made a central issue in the debate on the transition programme of the AFPRC is its life in office. Since the emergence of your Consultative Committee,
Unprecedented attention has been given to opinions regarding when it is to hand over the helm to an elected government. However, many opinions are being expressed by Gambians concerning alternative transitional arrangements which are designed to expand the circles of institutions and personalities that are to assist the AFPRC in governing. It is vital to deal with these secondary factors before dealing with the central issue, that is, the life span of the AFPRC in office.
ON INTERIM GOVERNMENTS
It is important to point out that due to ever growing crises in governance in many parts of the world; many political structures are being tested to make countries governable before the setting up of representative political institutions. It is essential for Gambians to do ground work on these developments in order to understand the circumstances which gave rise to such institutions before making proposals for their introduction in the Gambia.

In this vein, it is important to point out that interim government of national unity has been set up as a power sharing device in countries where many power blocs are created on the basis of tribe, place of origin or political affiliation. It becomes absolutely necessary when the power blocs are warring factions, and tactically justifiable when political blocs have the capacity to create a state of ungovernability. In this respect, the sharing of power in the form of an interim government of national unity helps to create a climate of governability during a transition period.
Of course, the history of such interim governments of national unity is yet to be fully written. What is evident at the moment is that once created, those who engage in power sharing often strive to see how they can perpetuate themselves or their associates in office in any future electoral arrangement. Consequently, the stability they create is short-lived. Temporally stability merely serves as a respite for war once a faction becomes dissatisfied with its gains, as we are seeing in Liberia.
Notwithstanding, where no force is capable of imposing its will to make a country governable, pending democratic transitions through representative institutions, necessity imposes on such people to establish interim government of national unity to promote national concord.
As for the Gambia, the country has not disintegrated yet. The political forces have displayed immense maturity in not fanning a state of ungovernability. People are already engaged in dialogue or exchanges of views on the political future of the country. Most of the ministers are civilians. Hence, imposing conditionality for change of ministers just to ensure power sharing will only amount to changing the circles of beneficiaries from ministerial posts. What is vital now is not for any of us to look for posts but to agree on an agenda regarding the determination of the political future of the country by her people in peaceful manner. Once this agreement is made, all the people will serve as a check to ensure that those who took it upon themselves to administer the transition framework do so in the public interest.
In South Africa, the ANC could have made the establishment of an interim government of national unity, prior to elections, a precondition for its participation in the transition exercise because of the grip that Mr De Klirk’s National Party had on the power establishments. However, in any such arrangements somebody must be left out or feel cheated because of the decision of a few, thus leaving room for more hostilities. However, where the people decide who is to hold political office, no one has the audacity to feel cheated. This is why the ANC emphasised the need for multi-racial elections rather than to squabble over the establishment of an interim government of national unity to preside over the transition process.
Hence, while the idea of establishing an interim government of national unity need not be dismissed completely in the Gambia, it must not be seen as a vital element or precondition to a successful transition to democratic constitutional existence. This is the first point. Let me move to the second point.
ON AN INTERIM NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
It is argued by some people that the AFPRC needs to form a National Assembly to serve as a check of its activities during the transition period. Is this a balanced notion?
First and foremost, it is important to know the nature of a thing or phenomenon before its uses can be properly identified. A National Assembly, House of Representatives and Parliament are representative institutions. The members of such institutions should be elected by the people. As representatives of such people, members of such bodies can exercise independence in defending the interest of the people without anybody being able to remove them from office. Hence, if any institution is established, whose members are not elected by the people, it may be called a National Assembly, Parliament or House of representatives in word. But in deed it can be nothing more than an advisory body, an adhoc committee.
For example, during the colonial days, the colonial government used to establish legislative councils which had no legislative authority. Its members were initially appointed and it took immense struggle before the elective principle was introduced for one Gambian member in 1946. These councils were mere advisory bodies. .
In my view, there is no need to direct the minds of the AFPRC to behave like colonial governors with their self created legislative councils or National Assemblies which will not have power to make laws. Such Assemblies would only constitute a drain on the national economy, fuel the competition for appointments as state dignitaries only to be empowered just to hand down unbinding recommendations which the AFPRC may accept or reject.
The very existence of your Consultative Committee has shown the type of institutions that could be viable in assisting the AFPRC to facilitate the establishment of the type of consultative governance environment. The AFPRC should be ready to establish many advisory committees whose members will serve as volunteers with no vested interests and even resign whenever they are prevented from doing their work properly. Such committee members should always have access to the public to promote debate on issues affecting their work.
For example, advisory committees on the economy, tourism, diplomacy, social affairs, etc could be set up to study specific problems and advice government on what to do. These committees could help to enlarge the democratic space.
Furthermore, the exchanges between members of the AFPRC and the press shows that if the press, in particular or the media, in general, plays their role of investigative journalism with efficiency and sincerity, corrupt practices can be prevented, abuse of authority checked and respect for the people and the public interest promoted during the transition period.
See next edition of focus as we follow Halifa’s contribution to the debate on the Timetable to Constitutional democratic rule after the coup of 1994.